Introduction

This volume contains revised versions of papers presented at the conference *Metaphysics of Culture—The Philosophy of Joseph Margolis* held in Helsinki, Finland, May 20–21, 2013, as well as several other contributions including Margolis’s own responses to each paper. The purpose of this introduction is to summarize these contributions and briefly indicate their connections to Margolis’s philosophy. It should also help give direction to those readers interested in a specific theme or issue highlighted by one or more contributions. Accordingly, readers are invited to pick and choose based on their interest. After beginning with Margolis’s own general statement of his approach to the metaphysics of culture, the volume is further divided into three main sections. The first contains chapters that focus on Margolis’s appropriation of the American pragmatist tradition. The second section addresses Margolis’s relation to other philosophers, including Husserl, Popper, Protagoras, and Quine, who he has been either explicitly critical of, or who share some affinities with his own view. The final section critically explores Margolis’s respective contributions to the philosophy of art, culture and religion. Lastly, we are grateful to Margolis himself for concluding the volume with his own reactions to the contributions seen here.

Margolis has an œuvre as broad as few other philosophical œuvres are. One of its characteristic features is the way it spans several different contexts: Originally rooted in Anglo-American philosophy, it has increasingly incorporated Continental approaches, ranging from Kant and Hegel to Habermas and (French) deconstructivism (albeit often in a critical spirit). Although it borrows from the analytic tradition—in particular, in its early phase—, it is also strongly committed to classical pragmatism.

If any label fits Margolis broad vision at all, it is that of ‘pragmatism’. Yet, it is a distinctive kind of pragmatism. Margolis critically engages with the work of C.S. Peirce and John Dewey, and further distinguishes his po-
sition from the more recent types of neo-pragmatism seen in the work of Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. For example, he rejects the ‘internal realism’ Putnam favors in the late 1980s and is also critical of Putnam’s later rejection of all ‘tertia’ (for further details see Honenberger’s contribution below). Margolis’ pragmatism is further distinguished from Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism, which he sees as undermining the entire project of philosophical legitimation.¹ This points to a fundamental metaphilosophical disagreement between Rorty and Margolis over the proper role of philosophy within contemporary intellectual life. This difference is further highlighted through Margolis’ sharing Rorty’s critique of classical (‘Cartesian’) forms of realism, but his resisting Rorty’s conclusion that this results in complete rejection of the philosophical viability of any form of realism.

In addition, this illustrates the way that Margolis sees the need for a philosophical perspective that shows a kind of unity within the diverse set of activities found in human life, where this involves a critical assessment of those activities as well as a constructive attempt to demonstrate both their interconnections and importance. Seen from this perspective we can make sense of the initially puzzling fact that while Rorty rejects the label ‘relativism’ Margolis accepts it. From Margolis’s philosophical perspective sketched above, the way Rorty combines his specific interpretation of pragmatism with a further commitment to ethnocentrism in order to reject any philosophical legitimation of our practices, looks like an extreme form of relativism, since he leaves us with no grounds for saying one view is better than another. So, while Rorty rejects the label ‘relativism’ since he thinks its intelligibility is tied to the very philosophical project that he rejects, for those like Margolis, who in some qualified way still adhere to this project, Rorty’s view could only be seen as an unacceptable form of relativism. Although Margolis is out to deconstruct all classical versions of absolutism, i.e. theories of cognitive privilege, essentialism, teleology, and the ‘archic canon’ of classical philosophy with its search for invariant structures, he does not embrace what he would view as the philosophically uniformed view of relativism Rorty embraces. Margolis’ endorsement of ‘relativism’ draws on the classical tradition of relativism and is based upon a rejection of a strict exceptionless adherence to the principle of bivalence (see the contributions by Zigoli and Grube in this volume). Yet, although it allows for the possibility of incongruent

¹ See Margolis 2002, 74.
judgments to exist side by side in certain domains of inquiry, it does not go so far as to undermine the entire project of philosophical legitimation or to abrogate all forms of realism. Indeed it is an attempt to provide a constructive philosophical understanding of how this form of relativism helps to make sense of and give a type of unity to the variety of human activities and practices at our disposal.

If we would classify philosophers on a scale between the two poles of absolutism and relativism, Margolis would fall on neither side. That is, he certainly does not fall on the absolutist side in the sense in which the Greek philosophers do, or Descartes and Kant (in Margolis’ understanding; but see the contribution by Pihlström in this volume). Yet, he does not fall on the extreme relativist side either—at least not, if we identify this side with Rorty, French deconstructivism and related approaches. In a sense, Margolis searches for a third way between the extremes of absolutism and relativism.

Of course, with his insistence on the historicity of thinking, flux rather than invariance, and his further acknowledgement of contingency (in that whatever we posit ontically are our epistemic constructions), Margolis is closer to the relativist pole than the absolutist one. Yet, characteristically, he does not pursue the relativistic implications in these (and related) issues all the way down. For example, he does not revel in contingency the way Rorty does with his celebration of ethnocentrism. Thus, in some sense of the word, Margolis searches for the safe passage of Medina in order to avoid the absolutist Scylla as well as the relativist Charybdis. Although the way he works out this passage differs from Putnam, Richard Bernstein, and (slightly) from Thomas Kuhn, he shares their intention to avoid both extremes.

We are pleased to offer the varied contributions of this volume as a means for furthering the understanding of Margolis’ wide ranging and impressive philosophy. The first contribution, Joseph Margolis’ “Toward a Metaphysics of Culture’ contains a useful overview of Margolis’ recent views, where he emphasizes the centrality of the artifactual self and the Intentionality of the cultural world of human persons. It is then devoted to a subject upon which all of Margolis’ inquiries converge, according to his own estimate, namely, the ‘definition of the human self and the analysis of the unique features of the human world and our form of life’.

For scholars familiar with Margolis’ work, this self-estimate may be somewhat surprising. If one looks at his philosophy as a whole, this particular topic does not seem so central. As the contributions below will
demonstrate, Margolis has indeed written on the nature of the human self. The artifactuality thesis appears in numerous places and he has worked on the interpretation of cultural entities since the beginning of his career. However, his original treatment of the artifactuality of the self was based on an analogy with artworks and in terms of “second-natured” Bildung. Sometime in the 80s, under the influence of the "philosophical anthropologists" and the pioneering work of Marjorie Grene, he took a further step in affirming that the human person was itself a cultural transform of the human primate. In his most recent work he plans to go further still and offer a first reading of the theory of human culture, in terms of an analysis of “person,” “action,” “cultural world” and “social practice”. So the convergence he finds in his "Metaphysics of Culture” paper is a culmination of themes discussed at various times and places.

Moreover, the reason why Margolis considers the subject of the self to be the converging point of his philosophical work has to do with, at least, two features: first, through his non-standard approach to the human self, which relies on a synthesis between (what he calls) a post-Darwinian approach and a Hegelian (and pragmatist) account of Bildung. This non-standard approach enables him to pursue the issue of the human self in unexpected ways and relate it to other philosophical topics in an unorthodox fashion in a way which will become clearer below. Second, his use of ‘convergence’ is not to be understood as pointing to a theme which explicitly dominates his work but, rather, as that which underlies much of his discussion of other philosophical topics. It is not so much a quantitative as a qualitative category: The topic of the human self upon which his works converge is not the explicit center of his philosophy but the implicit wheel upon which many other subjects turn—or, at least, can be reconstructed from.

Viewed in this sense, as a wheel upon which other philosophical subjects turn, the statement that Margolis’ inquiries converge on the subject of the human self loses much of its initial implausibility. After, all it is intuitively clear that this subject ramifies into other areas of philosophizing, such as the discourse on (reductive) naturalism and the reconstruction of the relationship between the human and the natural sciences. However, Margolis’ account of the human self ramifies into other philosophical subjects in unexpected ways. As will become clear, these ramifications reach into issues such as realism and even that of (Kantian) transcendentalism in Margolis’ hands.
Finally, it should be mentioned by way of introduction that by emphasizing the human self as the wheel upon which many other philosophical subjects turn, Margolis takes up a topic that has been neglected in philosophy. This is remarkable in so far as much philosophical discussion is based upon anthropological presuppositions. This is true not only for ethics and philosophies such as pragmatism which explicitly rely on anthropological assumptions but also for philosophical discourses which rely implicitly on anthropological assumptions. An important example is epistemology which, ultimately, rests upon assumptions on the range and limits of the capacity of human cognition. Take, for example, empiricist-based approaches, such as logical positivism, which never adequately face issues revolving around the self in a constructive fashion. This is particularly remarkable in the face of the fact that their emphasis on the cognitive privileges ascribed to ‘protocol sentences’ by (some) Logical Positivists assumes a cognitive subject. Their focus on capturing the objective observable content of experience blinds them to making any sense of the subject’s nature and role within that experience.

Not that empiricist approaches always stay clear from anthropological considerations. Yet, if they delve into them, it is mostly by adding some kind of materialist doctrine to their empiricist agenda. Yet, materialism is such a heavily metaphysically-loaded doctrine—at least, in its classical 18th century version as well as in its 20th century successor, physicalism—that any attempt to legitimize it within empiricist parameters is a non-starter. The same holds for the currently popular versions of bio-evolutionary reductionism, such as ‘speculative’ or ‘scientist Darwinism’ (as opposed to Margolis’ ‘post-Darwinism’; see below): Whatever else may speak in its favor, it is hopelessly overburdened if used for the purposes of squeezing out some notion of the self.

Margolis’ devastating critique of all forms of scientism makes that unambiguously clear: Reductionist approaches fail to account for important features of the human self, such as Intentionality (see below). As he keenly observes, naturalism has got it wrong from the start. In his view naturalism ‘must be tailored to what we take to be executive facts of the human world’. That is, naturalism is conceptually dependent upon an account of the human self rather than providing a sufficient basis for such an account.

A notable exception to this bleak picture is obviously pragmatism. The classical pragmatists offer resources which allow for a non-reductionist account of the human self. As will become clear below, Margolis draws on their resources. It is to be hoped that, in the wake of pragmatism’s
ascendence\textsuperscript{2}, non-reductionist, philosophical anthropology will rise, too. As will become clear below, Margolis provides a fresh start on this much needed but regrettably neglected subject of the human self.

1. Margolis

The central thesis of Margolis’ contribution ‘Toward a Metaphysic of Culture’ is that the human self is not a natural-kind but a ‘second-natured transform of a natural kind’. In section 1, he suggests that the human primate has transformed itself gradually into a functional self or person whereby the mastery of language and its transmission between generations including the self-reflexive awareness of those evolving skills is most crucial.

His account of the human self is then driven by an opposition to two positions, viz. to reductionism and to dualism. The former, e.g. ‘biologism’ and naturalism (in the above specified sense) ‘is inadequate in the face of the amplitude and uniqueness of the emergent human powers.’ The gradual transformation of the hominid primates through the invention and mastery of language—part of what Margolis’ means by ‘the lingual’—, into persons who have acquired important new artifactual competences cannot be accounted for by reference to biological factors alone. Obviously, cultural entities are embodied in corresponding natural entities (e.g. paintings in painted canvases and spoken words in uttered sounds) but are not reducible to merely physical terms.

The prime example of the latter, dualism, is Kant with his duality of causality and human autonomy or freedom. Margolis rejects Kant’s ‘transcendentalism’—by which Margolis means the outcomes of Kant’s transcendental analysis with its supposedly \textit{a priori} claims (which leaves the possibility of reconstructing transcendental claims on \textit{an posteriori} basis intact). Transcendentalism (in this sense) is vulnerable to empirical counter evidence and is incompatible with the discoveries of post-Darwinian paleoanthropology.

Approaching the issue from an unexpected angle, Margolis applies his account of the human self to the discussion of reality: Our claims regarding the world have an artifactual side to them. Yet, this does not mean that they are nothing but constructions of the cognizing mind. According to Margolis, this is one of the ‘splendid corrections Hegel provides in his critique of Kant’ and ‘pragmatism is the upshot of “Darwinizing” this particular correction’.

\textsuperscript{2} See Margolis 2012.
It should be noted that ‘Darwinizing’ refers in Margolis’ hands not so much to the direct import of Darwin’s own account of evolution which is rather ‘speculative’ and uninformed by (later) empirical inquiries, such as embryology. Rather, this term refers to the Wirkungsgeschichte of Darwin’s account, i.e. predominantly to the post-Darwinian paleoanthropological record.

The basis for Margolis’ account of the self is thus not biology but, surprisingly, the philosophy of art: He proceeds by invoking a strong analogy between the creation of an artwork and the Bildung of persons: Both are hybrid natured. That is, although both are thoroughly natural things they ‘have (or are) histories rather than natures’. The lingual as well as the Intentional (in the capitalized, Margolian sense) emerge in the natural world but do not ‘”supervene” on the natural in any way that can be algorithmically or nomologically inferred from adequate materialist descriptions. . . ’.

In section ii, Margolis refers to the ‘philosophical anthropologists’, i.e. a group of biologically-minded German philosophers in the interval spanning the 1920s and 1960s: Helmuth Plessner and Adolf Portmann and, in a sense, Jakob von Uexküll and Arnold Gehlen explored the ‘profound inadequacy of the Darwinian model of evolution’. Their reception by the ‘pioneer American philosopher of biology’, Marjorie Grene, provides an important source of inspiration for Margolis’ account of the human self. Grene suggests that the self can only emerge by using language, social conventions, etc. Margolis takes that to imply that ‘the full measure of being human. . . depends on the Bildung of an enabling language and the culture it makes accessible. . . ’

Following Portmann, Margolis emphasizes the importance of embryological studies and its progress in the 20th century. The development of the fetus decisively confirms the view that the human species is ‘biologically formed to be cultural animals’ (Grene). In this context, Margolis proposes his main thesis, viz. that the self is a hybrid, second-natured artifact. The ‘achievements of the functional powers of enlanguaged selves is [sic!] ”culturally emergent” but not ”supervenient”’ in Jaegwon Kim’s sense.’

In section iv, Margolis distinguishes between two senses of Bildung: ‘External’ Bildung is the ‘the longitudinal process of intertwined biological and cultural evolution by which hominid primates first ”invented” (and mastered) true language and transformed themselves (into persons). . . ’. ‘Internal’ Bildung is the ‘inter-generational process by which neonates are enabled to enter the lists of a supportive society of apt persons. . . by mastering the language and practices the mature members of their society already share.’
In section v, Margolis takes up the issue of the differences between the physical and the human science. Besides the well-known difference that human agency cannot be reduced to causal explanations, he emphasizes the importance of the interpretive disciplines when explicating the Intentional which belongs to the encultured world. Finally, he suggests that ‘interpretation may be rightly deemed to the most compendious and absorbing activity of the human self…’

2. Hildebrand

David Hildebrand’s ‘Margolis’s Pragmatism of Continuity’ locates pragmatism’s key insight in its use of practice, where this is more specifically interpreted as requiring that philosophy must begin with our experience of things and not with some prior theoretical interpretation of experience. He then uses this key metaphilosophical issue to further wonder about the starting point of Margolis’s own version of pragmatism. Margolis’s overarching systematic vision attempts to distill the key philosophical insights of the past while placing them within recent biological and cultural developments in the further attempt to offer a pragmatism for the 21st century. Hildebrand highlights the way that this systematic vision while in the service of promoting pragmatism appears in tension with the active, piecemeal, melioristic starting point of the classical pragmatists, especially John Dewey.

The tension seen by Hildebrand emerges with his claim that pragmatism fundamentally rejects the idea that philosophy begins in theory. This raises a deep question concerning philosophical starting points: where does a philosopher begin when articulating and defending a philosophical position? Asking this question of Margolis results in a stalemate of sorts. Hildebrand offers evidence that Margolis’s view may be too theoretically loaded for the philosophical pragmatist. However, he also discerns several points in Margolis’s work that hint at the Deweyan inspired experiential starting point of philosophy that he takes as central for pragmatism. And so on this question about Margolis’ starting point as a philosopher the evidence remains inconclusive. Hildebrand concludes that it remains unclear where Margolis stands on what is perhaps the deepest methodological issue for a pragmatist. So, the issue remains concerning what is Margolis’s starting point in philosophy and this raises further questions concerning how it contributes to the sort of social and moral perspective
that Margolis thinks a proper view of pragmatism must bring to an ailing world.

3. Jacquette

In ‘Margolis On The Progress of Pragmatism’, Dale Jacquette evaluates Margolis’s historical reconstruction of what he recognizes as the main advantages of pragmatist thought. Jacquette focuses on the recent Pragmatism Ascendent: A Yard of Narrative, a Touch of Prophecy, where Margolis provides an extended examination of the past and future fortunes of pragmatism. He finds three core elements in Margolis’s account, where the first offers a sympathetic reading of Hegel’s criticisms of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and the second highlights Peirce’s view of inquiry and its fallibilism as his chosen model for implementing Hegel’s critique of Kant. Lastly, Margolis presents his optimistic future for pragmatism, once it is properly seen as a synthesis of Hegel’s humanized idealism with Darwin’s key insights. Jacquette questions the historical framework that Margolis uses in support of his forward-looking view of pragmatism. More specifically, he argues that Margolis’s Hegel-friendly defense of pragmatism’s core advantages, can be better located in a more sympathetic reading of Kant’s main achievements.

Jacquette characterizes his proposal as showing that Margolis’s description of the progress of pragmatism proceeds more convincingly from a correct reading of Kant’s theory of knowledge than from Hegel’s mistaken criticism of Kant’s apriorism. In carrying out this strategy, he begins by first distinguishing between conditional and unconditional apriorisms. He then uses this distinction to argue that Margolis’s advocacy of Hegel’s objections to Kant apply only to an unconditional apriorism that Kant is not committed to. Jacquette then further argues that Kant accepts only a weaker conditional apriorism that is immune to Hegel’s and Margolis’s criticisms. Kant is not then, on Jacquette’s reading, dogmatic concerning any single predetermined choice of some necessary unconditional a priori conclusions. Rather he advocates a carefully crafted conditional apriorism of the following form: If our best science teaches \( p \), then the absolute presuppositions of \( p \) are revealed by transcendental reasoning as necessary a priori truths required by the given science in order for proposition \( p \), not yet to be true, but merely logically possible. This form of conditional apriorism survives revolutionary scientific changes, where new concep-
tions of physics not known by Kant would still have their own necessary a priori truths as the prior logical conditions of these physical truths. Further support for aligning Margolis’s project with Kant’s is offered with Kant’s promotion of philosophical anthropology, which inserts the type of humanized perspective into philosophy that Margolis sees as absent until Hegel. Jacquette further defends and develops his interpretation of Kant’s critical project by citing the Prolegomena where Kant argues that his conclusions could in principle be rejected by those with better insights into the issues that he takes as indispensable in treating metaphysics as a science.

4. Honenberger

In his contribution ‘The Poverty of Neo-Pragmatism: Rorty, Putnam and Margolis on Realism and Relativism’, Phillip Honenberger compares Margolis’ insistence on (his kinds of) realism and relativism to Putnam’s and Rorty’s views. He first traces the development of Putnam’s and Rorty’s respective positions before comparing them with Margolis’ views.

In the 1980s, Putnam defended an ‘internal realism’. This form of realism was intended to provide a middle ground between, on the one hand, a ‘metaphysical realism’ and, on the other, post-modern views which Putnam associated with Michel Foucault, Rorty and Thomas Kuhn. Yet, this form of realism was criticized as collapsing into relativism. This was one of the reasons why Putnam changed his view later adopting a ‘natural realism’ that treats our epistemic situation as being in ‘unmediated’ contact with a mind-independent world.

Honenberger considers Margolis’ ‘constructive realism’ to be similar to Putnam’s ‘internal realism’ insofar as the former posits the possibility of a correspondence between our utterances and their objects provided that the objects in question are understood as accessible to us only as constructed posits. The difference lies in Margolis’ emphasis upon historical contingency in our constructive efforts as emerges in his rejection of all forms of what he calls ‘Cartesian realism’ (under which not only classical figures like Descartes and Kant are subsumed but also current ones, such as Dummett, Davidson, and (although debatably) Putnam in his internal realist phase). Also, Putnam’s insistence on defining truth as ‘idealized rational acceptability’ and on the notion of a ‘Grenzbegriff’ is absent in Margolis’ account. Whereas Putnam’s internal realism is ultimately committed to some version of Kantian transcendentalism and verificationist
presuppositions, Margolis’ realism is motivated by cultural anthropology and the history of ideas, such as by Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, according to Honenberger.

While both Putnam and Rorty reject the label ‘relativism’ for their accounts, Margolis expressively accepts it. Yet, Margolis favors a particular kind of relativism: He rejects all relationalist forms of relativism according to which truth is relativized to some conceptual scheme, say, a language (‘true in Language 1 but false in language 2’) because they are self-contradictory. His relativism draws upon rejecting bivalence in favor of a many-valued logic (for further elucidation of Margolis’ rejection of bivalence, see Grube’s essay below).

Putnam, however, emphasizes from the late 1980s onwards ‘conceptual relativity’ according to which there is no ‘use of “exist” inherent in the world itself’. Rather, the way in which we describe reality is dependent upon our underlying concepts and there is no ‘Archimedean point’ which determines what concepts to apply. Honenberger considers this form of relativism to be considerably less radical than Margolis’.

In his later, natural realist phase, Putnam has emphasized (following Dewey) a ‘transactionist’ view according to which human organisms transact with their environment—what he calls ‘liberalized functionalism’. Yet, Honenberger emphasizes that the form of transaction Putnam has in mind is largely naturalistic and organic and thus neglects ‘the social, historical, artifactual and symbolic mediation of our relation to the world’. Putnam’s ‘liberalized functionalism’ thus contrasts sharply with Margolis insistence on interpretive tertia, ‘thirds’ which stand in between human interaction with the world (construed in a way to meet Davidson’s complaints against tertia)—which can accommodate historicity and contingency, such as that implied in using language, technology, social institutions, etc.

Comparing Rorty with Margolis, Honenberger reminds us of Rorty’s critique of all forms of representationalism, i.e. the idea of a correspondence between words and the world. According to Rorty, there is no way to ‘step out of our skins’, whatever they are, say, the linguistic conventions within which we think. Honenberger, however, rejects Rorty’s view by introducing Hegelian externality, i.e. the possibility that we re-construct our previous constructions of the word/world relation according to a more mature view (as, say, we reconstruct our childhood views when we reach maturity). Although there may be no ‘God’s eye point of view’ available from which to judge ‘objectively our constructions of the word/world relationship, it is contra Rorty possible to ‘step out of our skins’—the usefulness of which can hardly be doubted.
Rorty rejects ‘the given’ which emerged in 20th century philosophy, i.e. reference to ‘bare facts’ as rock bottom for knowledge-acquisition (as e.g. in the logical positivist insistence on protocol-sentences) in favor of ‘ethnocentrism’. We should give up all pretensions of somehow ‘exiting’ language, in particular, of attempts to evaluate language’s relationship to reality. Rather, we should regard language as a tool for communication and problem solving. Again, Honenberger emphasizes that Rorty over-estimates the consequences which follow from his critique. In line with Margolis ‘relativistic realism’, in particular, Margolis’ (anti-Davidsonian) insistence on the value of (appropriately qualified) ‘interpretive tertia’, Honenberger emphasizes that the description of language as a tertium quid or even a picture is not incompatible with Rorty’s insistence that it is a tool. Rather, the latter cannot be understood without the former—particularly so for the purposes of developing a ‘post-philosophical culture’ along Rortyian lines.

5. Pihlström

In his contribution “‘Languaged’ World, ’Worlded’ Language’: On Margolis’s Pragmatic Integration of Realism and Idealism’ Sami Pihlström reconstructs Margolis’ (pragmatist-inspired) synthesis of realism with antirealism and its relationship with pragmatist metaphysics of culture as a form of transcendental pragmatism. In Pihlström’s eyes, this form of transcendental pragmatism is closer to Kant than Margolis himself thinks.

Pihlström’s strategy is to integrate Kantian transcendental idealism into the discussion on pragmatism’s relevance for the contemporary debate on realism and idealism. He questions Margolis’ claim that Kant is incoherent from the start and suggests to reconstruct the story of the emergence of pragmatism by starting with Kant—rather than from Hegel, as Margolis does.

However, Pihlström favors Margolis over many contemporary realists since the latter rejects the idea that metaphysical convictions about realism are part of the world’s ‘own’ account of itself. Rather, he holds that realism is itself a human posit. The ‘independent world’ Margolis’ minimal form of realism presupposes, is the best ‘picture’ of the world we currently have.

According to Margolis, we must view reality through our historically and culturally conditioned, hence practice-laden, epistemic perspectives rather than from a God’s eye point of view. For Margolis, reality and
language are intrinsically entangled so that all forms of realism which are not subordinated to historicist constructivism are hopeless.

Margolis’ constructivism implies that questions of knowledge, objectivity, truth, confirmation and legitimation are construed in accordance with our interpretive conceptual schemes and that, although we do not construct the actual world, our posits of the independent world are epistemically dependent on our meditating conceptual schemes. Pihlström suggests that this constructivism is "transcendental idealism by other means". This judgment is particularly apt for Margolis’ later specification of constructivism as ‘whatever is constructed as ontically independent of human inquiries is epistemically dependent’. Here, Pihlström proposes an equivalence to the Kantian synthesis of empirical (factual) independence and transcendental (epistemico-ontological) dependence.

Finally, Pihlström analyzes the link between Margolis’ pragmatism and his theory of emergence (for discussion of this theory, see the above Introduction and Pryba’s essay below): Margolis’ pragmatist should be a realist (in the sense specified above) about normative structures such as language and the mind (or self). Such a pragmatist account of emergence demonstrates the futility of a reductionist theory of culture and of mind. Although being fully natural, those normative structures are hopelessly underdetermined by merely factual, i.e. naturalist, explanations. Departing from Margolis at this point, Pihlström concludes by suggesting that the realism of emerging world-constructing selfhood should be construed as a transcendental presupposition of a pragmatic (constructivist) realism.

6. Niiniluoto

Illka Niiniluoto in his ‘Margolis and Popper on Cultural Entities’ offers a comparative study of Karl Popper’s and Margolis’s view of cultural entities that explores their respective similarities and differences. Despite their quite different philosophical pedigrees, he explains that they share a central insight in their use of nonreductive materialism to explain person-hood and other cultural entities. This agreement concerning the nature of human persons depends on their own distinctive way of claiming that persons are cultural artifacts. Margolis compares persons to cultural artifacts more generally, while Popper takes self-conscious persons to be what he describes as ‘World 3 entities’, that is, public products of human social action like languages, cultural objects, and other abstract entities including propositions and numbers.
Niiniluoto further argues that Popper’s conception of World 3 entities provides a better way to address the ontological status of human-made abstract entities such as works of art, social institutions, and mathematical objects. While Margolis’ attempt to account for cultural entities relies on their physical embodiment and is intended to cover all cultural entities, Niiniluoto claims that this view works best only for those artifacts which have a unique physical object as their embodiment, such as paintings and sculptures. The Popperian framework applies to a much larger domain of cultural objects because of its additional acceptance of “unembodied” entities. Popper is then in a better position to explain unanswered issues within the philosophy of mathematics since he can countenance the existence of abstract entities that have not be written down or thought about. Niiniluoto gives the example of the next prime number to be found by mathematicians, which has the property of being prime before its discovery. He concludes by offering his own Popperian inspired suggestion for dealing with abstract entities such as the infinite set of natural numbers, whose parts have not been studied without this reverting back to an unacceptable version of Platonism.

7. Hartimo

Mirja Hartimo compares Margolis’ and Husserl’s respective views in her contribution “In Defense of Transcendentalism: Vestiges of Kantianism in Margolis’ Naturalism”. Her main contention is that Margolis’ kind of naturalism and Husserl’s phenomenology exhibit significant similarities in spite of terminological differences.

Hartimo focuses primarily on the issue of normativity. She contends that both Margolis and Husserl subscribe to a kind of normativity which is embedded in culture, tradition and customs rather than based upon a priori reasoning. For Husserl, the analysis of norms is based upon ‘Besinnung’. ‘Besinnung’ aims at finding out the goal of an activity, such as a scientific one, by emphatically participating in the activity in question. Hartimo regards this to be compatible with Margolis’ naturalism since norms are internal to practices on both accounts rather than based upon a priori reasoning. Both can thus accommodate a pluralism about norms.

On the face of it, Husserl seems to conflict with Margolis on the issue of bivalence: Husserl insists on it whereas Margolis rejects this insistence. Yet, Hartimo shows that this difference can be relativized once we recognize that logic for Husserl is a goal to be achieved. Thus, Husserl’s insis-
tence on bivalence is not necessarily incompatible with Margolis’ view of the cognitive intransparency of the world.

Husserl uses the term ‘teleology’ to describe the normative structure which directs our conscious life. Yet, although Margolis rejects all teleological accounts, the difference between them is primarily of a verbal sort, according to Hartimo. Margolis has some sort of more or less fixed development towards some pre-determined goal in mind whereas Husserl’s ‘teloi’ refer to norms guiding our practices and its goals.

Provocatively, Hartimo proposes that Margolis’ account still displays vestiges of Kantianism since he proceeds from the results of the empirical sciences and only then tries to synthesize them into a coherent picture of the person. Yet, a phenomenologist would reject this procedure since the sciences provide only fragmented views of personality. The phenomenologist would rather proceed from a direct analysis of experience.

Hartimo recognizes differences between both Husserl and Margolis regarding their use of the term ‘relativism’: Margolis feels more comfortable using it than Husserl does. Also, Margolis seems to be more conservative regarding the Sitten embedded in our forms of life whereas Husserl was deeply troubled by the crisis of the European sciences. Yet, on the whole phenomenology and Margolis’ naturalism have more in common than what divides them, according to Hartimo. Both reject scientism, without going (in Margolis’ words) ‘extra-naturalist’, both emphasize the deeply historicized, ‘second-natured’ view of human beings, and they share a view of the sciences as human constructions without, however, denouncing objectivity.

8. Sinclair

In his ‘Margolis on Quine: Naturalized Epistemology and the Problem of Evidence’, Robert Sinclair offers a defense of Quine’s naturalized approach to epistemology against Margolis’s main criticisms, focusing especially on his claim that Quine’s use of sensory stimulation cannot account for the evidential support of scientific theories. Quine’s naturalized account of knowledge seeks to provide a better scientific account of the connections between the activation of our sensory surfaces and our theoretical discourse about the world. Margolis wonders how this appeal to physical sensory stimulation, which is causal, could provide evidential support for our theories. Margolis isolates a familiar but important worry
about Quine’s naturalized epistemology, which appears to confusingly (and inexplicably) mix the causal with the evidential.

Sinclair further shows that Margolis’s critical interpretation of key Quinean passages is largely correct when these passages are taken at face value. Responding to his criticisms involves some careful interpretive reconstruction concerning what Quine should have said, and a further consideration of other important features of his mature epistemological view. Once this is done Sinclair further explains that for Quine evidence consists of observable knowledge of facts about our immediate environment that are expressed in the form of observation sentences. Sensory input consists of the physical events of which we are unaware but which are causally responsible for the beliefs which get expressed in observation sentences, and which then further serve as support for such beliefs. Sinclair builds on these preliminary points by discussing Quine’s further reflections on the relations between theory and observation. Here he describes how the inferential gap between observation sentences and the standing sentences of a given theory are bridged with the implication of a categorical that through its parts is linked to observation sentences. The result is a detailed response to Margolis’s concern over how mere physical stimulation could serve to justify our scientific theories of the world.

Sinclair concludes that with this defense of Quine’s view in place, we can recognize that Quine’s overall view has much more in common with the pragmatist position that Margolis himself favors. The presence of these shared pragmatist affinities leaves some unanswered questions concerning what explains this apparent disagreement. Sinclair suggests that there remains a basic conflict between Margolis and Quine concerning the proper scope and function of pragmatist philosophy, and he further shows how this is reflected in Margolis’s cultural criticism of Quine’s asocial naturalism. He claims that this disagreement is so profound as to make neutral adjudication of this dispute unlikely.

9. Ziliolo

In his contribution ‘Protagoras and Margolis on the Viability of Ancient Relativism’, Ugo Zilioli analyzes the understanding of ancient relativism Margolis has provided in The Truth about Relativism. Zilioli’s aim is not only to show the plausibility of Margolis’ reconstruction of Protagoras’ view but also that he is entitled to defend the latter’s viability in light of his own concept of ‘robust relativism’.
Zilioli delves first into Socrates’ interpretation of Protagoras’ slogan “Man is the measure of all things, of those that are that are, of those that are not, that are not”. Socrates understands this maxim to be an epistemological thesis, viz. as a form of perceptual relativism according to which the phenomena are as they are perceived to be. Understood in such terms, Protagoras view reduces to a form of relationalism which is self-refuting. Yet, Protagoras’ view is probably not so much fed by the epistemological but rather by metaphysical and alethic, that is, truth-related, concerns. In other words, it is best categorized under what Margolis calls ‘robust relativism’, viz. the suggestion to retreat from the bipolar pair of truth values to a many-valued logic, plus a thesis on the material world: The latter is in a radical sense metaphysically indeterminate (thus challenging both Plato’s Forms and Aristotelian essences).

Although Zilioli agrees with Margolis’ reading of Protagoras and shares the view that it deserves to be defended, he raises a point of possible disagreement with Margolis since he places greater emphasis on indeterminacy than Margolis. Yet, Margolis has responded that, if indeterminacy is emphasized too strongly, the central difference between persons and other material things is jeopardized. That is, for Margolis, persons exhibit emergent properties which mere material things do not exhibit (for more details see Margolis’ ‘The Metaphysics of Culture’). In Margolis’ view, ancient relativism fails to accommodate this point if reconstructed too strongly along indeterministic lines.

10. Breshanan

Aili Bresnahan in her ‘How Artistic Creativity is Possible for Cultural Agents’ attempts to locate the source of individual artistic creativity within the larger cultural and social environment. Her starting point is Margolis’ view that both artworks and selves are “culturally emergent entities”. She then further considers the question of how Margolis’ view of the enculturated artist, as an individual emergent self, is able to make sense of an identity that is both from culture and proceeds to develop in a distinctive way from that culture. Her aim is to demonstrate how Margolis’ work on the artist as cultural agent is still capable of accommodating creative innovation within a given cultural context. Her main hypothesis then stresses that Margolis’ idea that a person both emerges from and is at work within a given culture still allows for that agent to acquire the skills needed to create a novel artistic contribution.
More specifically, she focuses on Margolis’ theory of the creative artist as cultural agent, but adds a genetic dimension required for the acquiring of cultural competence. This, she further claims, is where we must look for an explanation of why some enculturated persons are able to create exceptional innovations in the arts while others cannot. While she accepts Margolis’s view that innovation remains impossible for a non-cultured self, the results of highly creative and innovative artists, are, she argues not possible without an inborn potential to these creative abilities under the right conditions.

Her further defense of this point makes use of some empirical results drawn from recent theories of creativity from neuroscience and psychology. Such theories suggest that the locus of creativity is not just found in conscious thought, but also lies in the unconscious capacity to freely associate, thereby developing novel ideas that can form the basis for creative inspiration. The difference then between extraordinary genius and ordinary creativity then stems from some individual’s ability to access their unconscious states through intense focus and dissociation not available to others and their heightened ability to create free associations among those states. Breshanan further applies these empirical results to Margolis’ theory by suggesting that artists being emergent hybrids of nature and culture include those who are simply born with better physical materials from which to culturally emerge. Their intense focus and dissociation while culturally derived cannot come from culture alone and so the creativity of an innovative artist is in part due to having been born with superior resources for novel creation.

11. Pryba

In his contribution ‘Experiencing Culture: Reconsidering the Danto/Margolis Debate’, Russell Pryba analyzes Margolis’ famous charge that Danto’s theory precludes the existence of the cultural world. In Margolis’s eyes, Danto cannot have anything coherent to say about the truth-conditions for the application of cultural terms since he does not have a sufficient understanding of the nature of culturally enriched human selves at his disposal.

Pryba begins his account with summarizing the genesis of Danto’s theory: Proceeding from the observation that Warhol’s Brillo Box does not differ from any brillo box bought in a supermarket, Danto concludes that the difference between art and non-art cannot lie in perception but
must lie in theory. Following Margolis, Pryba charges Danto with holding a somewhat reductionistic account of perception, i.e. a view according to which seeing is equated with certain physiological functions of the eye. However, the history and culturally embedded character of the act of seeing is then neglected. As a consequence, a bifurcation between ‘optical reality’ and a ‘higher reality’ emerges. Yet, Pryba charges Danto with being unclear on the grounds upon which he distinguishes between optical reality and cultural reality.

In opposition to Danto’s incoherent approach—at least, in the eyes of both Margolis and Pryba—Margolis provides an analysis of culture which can account for the metaphysical nature of artworks based upon a broader theory of culture. This theory is based upon a ‘penetration thesis’ according to which the natural kind members of Homo Sapiens are transfigured ‘metaphysically’ by the process of language acquisition (enculturation) into persons (for further details see Margolis’ ‘Metaphysics of Culture’ above).

Pryba argues that Danto is incoherent when acknowledging the cultural character of the (supermarket) brillo boxes as originally conceptualized by Harvey since his phenomenological account does not provide the means to ground such a claim. Yet, according to Margolis’ ‘penetration’ thesis, perception is ‘culturally-loaded’ by linguistic and other enculturing processes, which transforms Members of Homo Sapiens into apt selves.

Pryba concludes his contribution by arguing that the point of the Danto/Margolis’ debate goes beyond the narrow question of the essence or definition of art. Rather, it extends into an account of the human self as creator of art. Pryba regards the decisive advantage of Margolis’ account as having provided a rich and compelling theory of the human person. He suggests that there is no better testament to the depth and complexity of the human ability to make meaning than Margolis’ philosophy.

12. Grube

In his contribution ‘Margolis’ Critique of Bivalence and its Consequences for the Theories of Action and Religious Pluralism’, Dirk-Martin Grube analyzes the consequences of Margolis’ critique of Bivalence for ethics and the philosophy of religion. Grube shows that Margolis’ concern for relativism is prompted by truth-related concerns since, at least, the 1980s (see the distinction between ‘relationalist’ forms of relativism and ‘robust’ forms elucidated in Honenberger’s contribution). Margolis calls those con-
cerns ‘alethic’ ones, meaning that they are on the nature of truth or restrictions on using the truth predicate (rather than on first-order truth claims).

His basic thesis is that alethic considerations cannot be fixed independently from ontological ones. Thus, considerations on the objects at stake can make a difference regarding the question what truth predicates to use. Grube summarizes this point under the heading alethic ‘a posteriorism’. Given alethic a posteriorism, Margolis suggests to abandon bivalence in certain domains of inquiry. For example, in domains where Intentional (for Margolis capitalized use of that term see the summary in Breshanan’s contribution) phenomena are at stake, bivalence is to be abrogated in favor of a many-valued logic.

Margolis’ critique of bivalence is then applied to the theory of action. Grube suggests that given certain objects of inquiry, a principled insistence on bivalence can be very imprudent or lead to morally unacceptable consequences. Those objects include cases which are so complex that we are currently incapable of distributing the bipolar pair of truth values over them but are at the same time of such a nature that we cannot afford to postpone deciding on them for too long. Grube points to the question whether global warming is caused by the exhaustion of pollutants as a case in point. In such examples, we should acknowledge the limits of our logical resources and use this acknowledgment as an invitation to go ‘extra-logical: Rather than insisting on bivalence, we should use prudential means, ‘rules of wisdom’, in order to maintain our capability for rational action and decision-making.

Finally, Grube traces the consequences of Margolis’ critique of bivalence into the theory of religion. Grube argues that classical pluralist theories of religion, such as John Hick’s pluralism based upon the postulate of the ‘Real an sich’, are found wanting. Margolis’ suggestion to retreat from bivalence provides an interesting alternative for construing a pluralist theory of religion: Whereas holding a religion to be true under bivalent parameters implies by definition to hold all other religions to be false, this is not necessarily the case under the parameters of a many-valued logic. Considering a religion to be ‘apt’ rather than true allows for the possibility that another religion can be ‘apt’, too. Retreating from bivalence provides thus an interesting potential for developing a theory of religious pluralism.
References
