Peirce & Early Analytic Philosophy

Helsinki, Finland

19-20 May 2009

Mirja Hartimo
Risto Hilpinen
Jaakko Hintikka
Christopher Hookway
Erkki Kilpinen
Elina Nurmi
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
Gabriel Sandu
Frederik Stjernfelt

pNordic Pragmatism Network
Helsinki Peirce Research Centre
Programme

Tuesday, May 19th

The symposium sessions take place at the Department of Philosophy, in room 334d, 3rd floor. Research seminar sessions in the evenings are scheduled in room 222, 2nd floor.

11.30–13.00
Christopher Hookway  
University of Sheffield
Normative Logic and Psychology: Peirce on Dewey

13.00–14.00
Lunch

14.00–15.15
Frederik Stjernfelt  
University of Aarhus
Diagrams and Categorial Intuition—Parallels between Late Peirce and Early Husserl

15.15–16.00
Mirja Hartimo  
University of Helsinki
Holism, Contextuality, and Compositionality in Husserl’s Logical Investigations

16.00–16.30
Coffee

16.30–18.00
Research seminar

18.15–19.45
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen  
University of Helsinki
Peirce’s Development of the Quantification Theory

Wednesday, May 20th

9.30–11.00
Christopher Hookway  
University of Sheffield
“The Form of a Relation”: Peirce and Mathematical Structuralism

11.00–12.30
Risto Hilpinen  
University of Miami
On the Identity and Meaning of Names

12.30–13.30
Lunch

13.30–14.15
Jaakko Hintikka  
University of Boston
The Ups and Downs of Logicism

14.15–15.00
Elina Nurmi  
University of Helsinki/Cornell University
Theory of Meaning in the Begriffsschrift—Two Misconceptions

15.15–16.00
Gabriel Sandu  
University of Helsinki/Université Paris I: Panthéon-Sorbonne
Frege, Ramsey, and Arbitrary Functions

16.00–16.30
Coffee

16.30–18.00
Research seminar

18.15–19.45
Christopher Hookway  
University of Sheffield
Habits and Interpretation: Defending the Pragmatism Maxim

Dinner
Mirja Hartimo (University of Helsinki)
Holism, Contextuality, and Compositionality in Husserl's Logical Investigations

While Gottlob's Frege's Lotzean background has been a focus of several studies since Hans Sluga's work in the early 1980s, Husserl's indebtedness to Lotze has not been studied much. The present paper will first examine Husserl's Lotzean background arguing that Husserl inherits ontological holism from Lotze. In secondary debates on Frege, it has been claimed that Lotzean ontological holism is the source for Frege's context principle “Never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation but only in the context of a proposition”. The present paper will then discuss not so obvious relationship between ontological holism and the semantic principles like the context principle in the Logical Investigations. After this we will show how Husserl solves the apparent tension between compositionality and contextuality.

Risto Hilpinen (University of Miami)
Names, Senses, Conceptions, and Objects

In his Logische Untersuchungen Edmund Husserl criticizes John Stuart Mill's account of meaning (or signification) as connotation, especially Mill's failure to separate the distinction between connotative and non-connotative names from the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless. According to Husserl, both connotative and non-connotative names have meaning or “signification”, that is, what Gottlob Frege calls the sense (“Sinn”) of an expression. The distinction between connotative and non-connotative names is a distinction between two kinds of meaning (or sense), attributive and non-attributive meaning (“attributive und nicht-attributive Bedeutung”). Attributive (connotative) names denote (refer to) objects through their attributes, whereas a non-attributive name means a thing directly (“direkt”). In this paper I examine the notion of direct meaning (or sense) by means of the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce, and compare Peirce's account with the views of Frege, Alexius Meinong, and David Kaplan and Gareth Evans.

Risto Hilpinen (University of Miami)
On the Identity and Meaning of Names

C. S. Peirce illustrates the distinction between types and their tokens by using words as an example (Collected Papers, paragraph 4.536):

A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or a printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word “word”, however, there is but one word “the” in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should be visible on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being only significant just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token.

According to Peirce, types are not existing objects; thus he seems to make here a distinction between the orthographic or phonemic character of a word and its individual occurrences (inscriptions or utterances). However, there is more to words than their character and their individual occurrences. This paper examines different ways of individuating name-words and discusses the relevance of the ontology of words to Frege's puzzles about the reference of names.
This essay explores two episodes in the history of a continuing debate about whether logic and epistemology can draw on information from psychology, history, biology and other special sciences, or whether logic must be the ‘pure’ study of a prior knowable, necessary laws of possible thought. The first episode involves Hermann Lötze and John Dewey. The former was a rationalist, a champion of pure logic who insisted that logic and psychology must be sharply separated; and the latter, in a series of four papers, subjected Lötze’s views to relentless criticism, advocating the view that logic was the ‘natural history of thought’; and proposing a rapprochement between logic and psychology. It is through Dewey’s work that pragmatism has come to be associated with the naturalistic view that there are no discontinuities between philosophical disciplines like logic and the natural sciences.

Christopher Hookway (University of Sheffield)

“The Form of a Relation”: Peirce and Mathematical Structuralism

In this paper, I shall argue, first, that, in his philosophical writings on mathematics, Peirce confronted problems that are similar to those that exercise contemporary philosophers of mathematics, and, second, that his responses to these problems, in particular his claim that the object of mathematical reasoning is “the form of a relation,” show that he accepts a version of a position that is now referred to as mathematical “structuralism”.

Christopher Hookway (University of Sheffield)

Habits and Interpretation: Defending the Pragmatism Maxim

Peirce’s pragmatic maxim was introduced as a methodological tool for clarifying the content of what in later years he referred to as ‘intellectual concepts’. By enabling us to obtain explicit formulations of such contents, it provides information that we can use in carrying out inquiries into hypotheses containing those concepts. It also enables us to recognize when expressions that purport to express coherent intellectual concepts fail to do so. We can thus abandon a priori ‘ontological metaphysics’ and we can also carry out scientific inquiries efficiently. The core idea behind Peirce’s maxim is that we can make the content of a conception fully explicit by identifying the effects that the objects of the concept have ‘which might conceivably have practical bearings’ As Peirce put it in 1878, ‘our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’

Why should we accept the pragmatist maxim? Peirce claimed that it was a merit of his version of pragmatism that its correctness could be proved and, from 1902 onward, he made a series of attempts to provide this proof. In earlier papers I have identified the strategies of proof that he employed in 1903 and in writings around 1905 and 1906. The current paper is concerned with a series of related and overlapping manuscripts dating from 1907 in which he presented what appears to be an alternative strategy for proving the correctness of pragmatism.

Elina Nurmi (University of Helsinki/Cornell University)

Theory of Meaning in the *Begriffsschrift*—Two Misconceptions

There is a long tradition in Frege-scholarship of approaching Frege’s writings as if they were in one respect like the famous Fregean senses—cognitively transparent. Little or no historical-exegetical work is believed to be required to understand, and correctly assess, the philosophical doctrines and arguments in Frege. In this paper, I seek to establish that looking at the work of Frege’s predecessors—the work of Frege’s teacher Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), in particular—is not just in some sense “instructive” or “illuminating,” but a precondition for a correct understanding of Frege’s views. The paper offers a new account of Frege’s *Begriffsschrift*-philosophy, which points to a new view of Frege’s philosophical development. It is widely believed that the following two claims are true of the *Begriffsschrift*: (I) In the *Begriffsschrift* Frege holds a Russellian view of propositions. (II) In the *Begriffsschrift* Frege operates with a distinction that is roughly equivalent to the later distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*).
I contend that the early sections of the *Begriffsschrift* should be interpreted against the background of Lotze’s philosophy; and when they are so interpreted, the motivation for (I) and (II) disappears. Contrary to (I), the Frege of the *Begriffsschrift* is not a Russellian, but thoroughly Lotzean about propositions (in the sense that he accepts Lotze’s doctrine, according to which judging involves “nothing but combinations of ideas”). And contrary to (II), there is nothing like the (semantic) distinction between sense and reference in the *Begriffsschrift*. There is only a distinction that closely resembles Frege’s later (metaphysical) distinction between sense and idea (Vorstellung).

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (University of Helsinki)

**Peirce’s Development of the Quantification Theory**

Three major transitions in Peirce’s development of the quantification theory are identified: the indexical, which presupposed a substitutional interpretation, the symbolic, which presupposed an objectual/game-theoretic interpretation, and the iconic, which presupposed a diagrammatic/continuity interpretation. These interpretations establish conclusively the full sense in which Peirce took logic to be the science of formal semiotic.

Gabriel Sandu (University of Helsinki/Université Paris I: Panthéon-Sorbonne)

**Frege, Ramsey, and Arbitrary Functions**

The paper deals with a controversial issue: the standard versus nonstandard interpretation in Frege’s and Ramsey’s work on the foundations of mathematics.

Frederik Stjernfelt (University of Aarhus)

**Diagrams and Categorial Intuition—Parallels between Late Peirce and Early Husserl**

The parallels and connections between late Peirce and early Husserl have not been much researched. This paper reviews the factual connections between the two and argues that there is a series of overlooked parallels between their philosophies, in particular with regard to the epistemological access to ideal objects. Here, Peirce’s notions of “diagram” and “diagrammatical reasoning” and Husserl’s notion of “categorial intuition” play similar roles in the overall structure of their theories.

Charles Sanders Peirce was a scientist, philosopher, mathematician and one of the founders of modern logic. Among the logical innovations attributed to him are quantification (independently of Frege), three-valued logic and a comprehensive system of existential graphs. At the same time, Peirce had an exceptionally wide conception of logic as the normative science concerned with the goodness of belief, inference and scientific inquiry.

The purpose of this symposium is to discuss and evaluate Peirce’s logical and philosophical ideas in contrast and connection with developments in logic and analytic philosophy that simultaneously and consequently took place in Europe.

The European thinkers of special interest to the symposium include Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Gottlob Frege, Edmund Husserl and Frank Ramsey.

The symposium is arranged by the Helsinki Peirce Research Centre at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Helsinki, Siltavuorentie 20 A.

The event is sponsored by the Nordic Pragmatism Network.